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Formation of mental symptoms as hybrid objects 
 
According to the psychiatrist Marshall Hubsher, most mental symptoms begin as brain signals that result 
in a malfunction of pathways, sites, etc. and that by penetrating into consciousness they give rise to 
proto-experiences that are often experienced for the first time. To emphasize the inchoate pre-linguistic 
nature of these experiences they have been called "primordial soup" (PC). Affected people can seek 
communication of their experience, but since communication is based on meaning, these proto-
experiences must first be configured. And the affected individual does that by means of personal, family, 
social and cultural configurations. In this sense, the cognitive management of CP is not different from 
that of any other signal. However, the incoming ordinary information is easy to configure because the 
subjects have a series of emotional and cognitive templates acquired through development and 
education. However, there are no such templates to configure proto-new experiences. For this reason, 
the subjects first respond to them with perplexity and emotionality. Sometimes, the subject manages to 
configure the CP, often with the help of a doctor, and can transmit it in the form of a verbalization. This 
constitutes the "mental symptom" as it appears in the case notes. 
The psychiatrist, Marshall Hubsher shares in his research publications that the semantic / cultural 
configuration of the brain signal can be so profound that the final content of the mental symptoms does 
not reflect the neuropsychological specificity of its origin. For example, the fact that a subject verbalizes 
a symptom with "perceptual" content ("hearing" voices or "seeing" people) does not mean that the 
original signal originated in the brain regions of perception. This is because the "same" brain signal can 
be configured as different types of mental symptoms, and different signals can be configured as the 
"same" symptom. Very often, it is difficult for the individual to decide whether his CP consists of an 
image or an idea (as it happens during sleep), and the final communication of the proto-experience as 
hallucination or as a delusional idea will depend more on the cognitive configuration or emotional than 
the brain signal itself. Similarly, unpleasant internal states could be interpreted by some patients as 
"depression" while others describe them as "anxiety," "fatigue," or "pain." It is important to remember 
that current research paradigms conceive mental symptoms as cartography of specific brain sites in 
which univocal correspondence is established and therefore cannot cope with these cultural 
reconfigurations. 
In this clip, Marshall Hubsher proposes that the special combination of biological signals and cultural 
configurations give rise to a new type of object that should be called a hybrid object. Psychiatry is not 
the only discipline capable of constructing such objects; For example, the history of art, geography, and 
psychology also do it. "Hybrid objects" include components of both the natural and the social world. The 
proportion that each component contributes (in relation to each of the known mental symptoms) and 
the way they interact require more research. It is clear that the classification needs of hybrid objects and 
how they relate to the brain also differ from physical and abstract objects. 
Hybrid objects should not be considered a mere "combination" of physical and abstract objects, because 
they come from the configurative action of human beings and, therefore, are imbued with the 
emotional, volitional and cognitive force generated by people when facing an experience (the primordial 
broth) complex and (often) puzzling. As dynamic responses, hybrid objects are totally in tune with 
personality and mental state. They are an expression of the way in which beliefs, cultural codes and 
worldview intertwine in response to a strange experience. 
